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The purpose of this paper is to survey 
recent game theoretic models of research and 
development, and to ask whether they yield 
practical implications or testable hypotheses. 
The papers I will be discussing have been 
written or published within the past five 
years; they have a good deal in common, 
relying upon similar assumptions and build­
ing upon each other. Because of this, the 
literature surveyed here may seem narrow, 
and some relevant work has probably been 
inadvertently omitted. I apologize for these 
omissions. For want of space, I will not 
discuss the normative conclusions of this 
literature.1 
I. Why Game Theory? 
As students of industrial organization, we 
cannot ignore interactions among the agents 
we study. Positive industrial organization is 
the study of business policy and strategy. 
Modern noncooperative game theory is a 
language of strategy and equilibrium; that is, 
it provides an equilibrium framework in 
which to examine individuals' strategic be­
havior. Recent advances, for instance the 
theory of supergames (James Friedman, 
1971) and the notions of perfect equilibrium 
(Reinhard Selten, 1975) and sequential ra-
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tionality (David Kreps and Robert Wilson, 
1982), have made game theory an even more 
powerful tool for examining controversial is­
sues in industrial organization. All models 
must postulate the behavior of some agents 
in the model; a game theoretic model 
must, in addition, impose certain consistency 
checks, or equilibrium conditions, upon this 
postulated behavior. Within the confines of 
the game theoretic paradigm, there are still 
many alternative modeling choices regarding, 
for example, informational assumptions and 
timing conventions. Thus the paradigm is 
capable of generating a wide range of equi­
librium behavior. As with any theory, the 
ultimate appeal for validation or vitiation is 
to empirical testing. I will isolate and discuss 
several implications, most of them controver­
sial, from the recent literature. This seems to 
be a useful first step toward the goal of 
empirical testing. 2 
II. The Implications of Recent Models
Because most of the papers discussed be­
low analyze and extend a single basic model, 
I provide a brief description of this model. 
Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz (1980) 
and Glenn Loury (1979) employ a model of 
stochastic invention in which the probability 
of success by firm i by a given time, t, is an 
exponential function. That is, if t; represents 
firm i's (random) success date, then Pr(t; � 
t)=l-e-h;r, where h; is the "hazard rate," 
or conditional probability density of success, 
given no success to date. The choice variable 
2Although previous empirical work is suggestive, most 
of it has not been carried out with a specific behavioral 
model of the firm in mind. Moreover, it has tested 
hypotheses which were couched in much more aggre­
gated terms than those to be discussed below. 
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for each firm i is a lump sum expenditure X; 
at time t = 0, which implies a hazard rate of 
h; = h(x;). With this specification, the ex­
pected time till success for firm i is the 
reciprocal of the hazard rate; E(t;) = 
l/h(x;). The innovation "production func­
tion" h ( x) is allowed to have initial increas­
ing returns to scale, but eventually decreas­
ing returns set in. Patent protection is 
assumed perfect, firms are identical, and no 
further innovation is anticipated. This prob­
lem is modeled as a simultaneous-move game, 
and the equilibrium concept is Nash equi­
librium in investment strategies. Tom Lee 
and Louis Wilde (1980) modified this formu­
lation by assuming that the investment is a 
flow cost, rather than a lump sum payment at 
the initial date. That is, firm i pays at the 
rate X;, but only until someone succeeds. 
They maintain all of the remaining assump­
tions of the model. The first three implica­
tions turn on this difference in the specifica­
tion of costs. 
1. The amount invested by an individual
firm decreases with the number of firms en­
gaging in R&D; however, aggregate industry 
investment increases with the number of 
firms. 
1'. The rate of investment by an individ­
ual firm increases with the number of firms 
engaging in R&D; a fortiori, the aggregate 
industry investment rate increases with the 
number of firms. 
Using the Dasgupta-Stiglitz and Loury 
fixed cost model, one can conclude that the 
equilibrium amount invested by any one firm 
decreases with the number of firms engaged 
in research and development. Despite this, 
an increase in the number of firms engaged 
in R&D results in an increase in aggregate 
investment. From the Lee-Wilde flow cost 
model, one can deduce that the equilibrium 
rate of expenditure per firm increases with 
an increase in the number of firms; a fortiori, 
aggregate investment increases with the num­
ber of firms. The intuition behind these con­
clusions is simple. In the Dasgupta-Stiglitz 
and Loury model, an increase in the number 
of firms reduces the expected benefit to in­
vestment (a particular firm is less likely to 
win), leaving expected costs unchanged. The 
firm responds by reducing investment. In the 
Lee-Wilde model, both expected benefits and 
expected costs are reduced by the addition of 
another firm (since the flow investment will 
be made for a stochastically shorter period of 
time), and the net effect is to enhance incen­
tives to invest. Implications 1 and l' are not 
inherently contradictory; it is quite possible 
that although the flow rate of investment 
increases, expected discounted flow costs de­
crease with an increase in the number of 
firms. What are contradictory are these mod­
els' respective implications regarding the 
effect of an increase in the number of firms 
upon the expected time until success for an 
individual firm. Since in both cases, E(t;) = 
l/h(x;), we see that the fixed cost model 
implies that E(t;) increases with the number 
of firms, while the flow cost model implies 
that E(t;) decreases with the number of firms. 
When one relaxes the assumption of per­
fect patent protection, it is easy to construct 
examples in which an increase in the number 
of firms decreases the individual rate of in­
vestment in a flow cost model; this is because 
if imitation is a sufficiently attractive alterna­
tive, the firm is less concerned about being 
first (see my 1982 paper). In fact, when imi­
tation is sufficiently swift and complete, there 
may be an inverse relationship between ag­
gregate investment and the number of firms 
in the industry (Carl Futia, 1980). An alter­
native form of nonappropriability occurs 
when rival firms experience significant posi­
tive spillovers from each others' research and 
development expenditures. If these spillovers 
are sufficiently large, then aggregate invest­
ment is inversely related to the number of 
firms in the industry (Michael Spence, 1982). 
Thus both the degree of appropriability and 
the number of firms have direct effects on 
investment; in addition, there are interaction 
effects between the degree of appropriability 
and the number of firms. Since the number 
of firms engaging in R&D is also endog­
enous, any test of these hypotheses requires a 
simultaneous equations approach. 
2. In a Nash equilibrium with unre­
stricted entry, there will be excess capacity in 
the R&D technology. 
2'. In a Nash equilibrium with unre­
stricted entry, there will be no excess capac­
ity in the R&D technology. 
In the lump sum expenditure model of 
Loury and Dasgupta-Stiglitz, it can be shown 
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that with unrestricted entry, in equilibrium 
firms will operate their R&D projects in a 
region of increasing returns to scale. In the 
fl.ow cost model of Lee-Wilde, this result is 
reversed; firms will always operate in the 
decreasing returns portion of the innovation 
production function. 
3. At equilibrium, an increase in aggre­
gate rival investment results in a decrease in 
investment by a single firm. 
3'. At equilibrium, an increase in the 
aggregate rival investment rate results in an 
increase in the rate of investment by a single 
firm. 
In the fixed cost models, the profit-maxi­
mizing investment is smaller the greater is 
aggregate rival investment, while in the fl.ow 
cost models, the profit�maximizing rate of 
investment is greater the greater is the ag­
gregate rival investment rate. Alternatively 
put, in the fixed cost models, best response 
functions are decreasing at equilibrium, while 
in the fl.ow cost models, they are increasing. 
These models all focused upon symmetric 
equilibria in which no previous innovation 
was assumed and no future innovation is 
anticipated. Any stochastic theory of in­
dustry evolution will give rise to asymmetric 
initial conditions; moreover, M. Therese 
Flaherty (1980) has demonstrated the manner 
in which industry members who are initially 
identical may end up following divergent 
paths even when industry evolution is com­
pletely deterministic. In view of these theo­
retical considerations as well as the obvious 
empirical fact of asymmetry, it is important 
to develop asymmetric models of innova­
tion if we wish to apply them to real indus­
tries. The models discussed below add such 
an asymmetry, either through an inherited 
asymmetric market structure, or through the 
assumption of a leader/follower, rather than 
simultaneous-move, framework. The next few 
implications deal with the impact of current 
monopoly power and anticipated future in­
novation upon incentives to invest in R&D 
when firms invest simultaneously. 
4. There is an inverse relationship be­
tween the magnitude of an innovation and 
the likelihood that it is invented by a current 
industry leader. 
5. Investment in R&D is lower for a 
large incumbent firm and challengers alike 
the greater is the fl.ow of current revenue to 
the incumbent firm. 
6. The rate of individual firm investment 
on a particular innovation declines with the 
number of anticipated subsequent innova­
tions. 
These results follow from the model of a 
sequence of innovations developed in my 
forthcoming article. An innovation is termed 
drastic if the innovator captures a sufficiently 
large share of the post-innovation market; 
that is, if the innovation substantially re­
places whatever product or process was pre­
viously used. When firms anticipate a se­
quence of drastic innovations, the current 
industry leader, or incumbent, invests less 
than each challenger and will thus succeed 
itself as incumbent (on average) less than 
l/n percent of the time, where n is the 
number of firms. The intuition behind this 
result is straightforward. When invention is 
uncertain, a firm making higher profits today 
gains relatively less from invention than a 
firm with lower current profits; consequently, 
an industry leader invests less than a chal­
lenger or potential entrant. A simple exten­
sion of this model indicates that for innova­
tions which are minor (i.e., for which the 
innovator captures a sufficiently small frac­
tion of the market), the incumbent will invest 
more than a challenger. Thus we would ex­
pect an inverse relationship between the 
magnitude of the innovation and the likeli­
hood that it is developed by a current in­
dustry leader. Moreover, this implication is 
robust to changes in the specification of costs; 
that is, this result is insensitive to the fixed 
versus fl.ow cost assumption. Using a single 
innovation, fixed cost model with one in­
cumbent monopolist and one challenger, 
Richard Freeman (1982) found that for large 
innovations a single challenger will invest 
more on R&D than an incumbent monopo­
list; Thomas von Ungern-Stemberg (1980) 
found that for small innovations an in­
cumbent monopolist will invest more than a 
challenger, and that the probability that the 
monopolist will succeed first is decreasing 
with the magnitude of the innovation. 
The second implication above is a pure 
equilibrium effect. An increase in fl.ow reve­
nues to the incumbent has no direct effect 
upon the challenger's payoff; however, it does 
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induce the incumbent to invest at a lower 
rate. Because my model (forthcoming) em­
ploys a flow cost specification, best response 
functions are increasing; consequently, the 
equilibrium response of challengers is to re­
duce their investment as well. 
Finally, implication 6 is a consequence of 
two effects; a sequence of anticipated future 
innovations reduces the value of being the 
incumbent (because no firm can expect a 
long tenure as incumbent when many in­
novations remain), and increases the value of 
being a challenger (because one has many 
remaining opportunities to succeed). These 
two effects combine to reduce current invest­
ment in R&D. 
The following implications discuss the im­
pact of changing the timing of the game; 
suppose that there is a leader/follower struc­
ture (in which the incumbent monopolist 
moves first) rather than a simultaneous-move 
structure. 
7. If the innovation production process 
is nonstochastic, then a firm which currently 
dominates an industry will persist as a mo­
nopolist, because it will preemptively patent 
innovations before potential entrants. 
8. The above argument holds only if the 
industry is one in which the threat of anti­
trust intervention precludes ex post negotia­
tion and exclusive licensing. If ex post licens­
ing is permitted, the most efficient firm would 
patent the innovation, but this need not be 
the incumbent. 
The model which generates the first of 
these implications appears in Dasgupta­
Stiglitz (1980), and is more fully developed 
in Richard Gilbert and David Newbery 
(1982). Gilbert-Newbery describe a bidding 
model of R&D in which invention is de­
terministic; thus the question of who invents 
is essentially one of who has the most to gain 
from doing so. An entrant will be willing to 
bid post-innovation duopoly profits for the 
innovation. By permitting entry, the in­
cumbent and the entrant receive post­
innovation duopoly profits; by preemptively 
patenting the innovation, the incumbent re­
ceives post-innovation monopoly profits. 
Since the present value of monopoly profits 
exceeds the sum of duopoly profits, the mo­
nopolist will bid more for the innovation 
(i.e., patent it before the entrant). The 
qualification is voiced by Stephen Salant 
(1984), who argued that if an entrant antic­
ipates the possibility of innovating and sub­
sequently selling out to the current in­
cumbent, then it will not evaluate the gains 
from inventing as merely its share of duop­
oly profits, but will include the expected 
gains from licensing its patent to the in­
cumbent. In this case, the most efficient firm 
-not necessarily the incumbent-would 
patent the innovation. 
9. Licensing encourages research when 
production costs are relatively similar, and 
discourages research when production costs 
are relatively disparate. 
In a two-firm model of research and devel­
opment with licensing, Nancy Gallini and 
Ralph Winter (1983) discuss two incentives 
to license. The first of these, termed the ex 
post incentive, is the one identified by Salant 
-the incentive to reduce production in­
efficiencies and monopolize the output mar­
ket. There is also an ex ante incentive 
to license (originally identified by Gallini, 
1983), which reflects the gain from eliminat­
ing wasteful research expenditures as well as 
the threat of a potentially low-cost competi­
tor. By licensing its technology to a poten­
tial challenger at a sufficiently low royalty 
rate, an incumbent firm can make R&D a 
less attractive prospect to the challenger; this 
simultaneously reduces expenditures on 
R&D, and removes the threat that the chal­
lenger may discover a very low-cost technol­
ogy.· Thus a large ex post incentive makes 
research attractive, while a large ex ante in­
centive reduces the return to research. When 
production costs are sufficiently similar, ex 
ante incentives are too weak to dominate the 
gains from R&D generated by ex post incen­
tives, and investment is encouraged. When 
production costs are sufficiently dissimilar, 
ex ante incentives dominate, and investment 
is discouraged. Empirical testing again would 
require a simultaneous equations approach 
in which investment in research and develop­
ment and some measure of licensing behav­
ior are to be explained. 
10. Over the course of developing an 
innovation, the configuration of firms engag­
ing in R&D will become more concentrated 
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as some firms fall sufficiently far behind and, 
consequently, drop out. 
Equilibrium behavior in the models of 
Drew Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Chris­
topher Harris and John Vickers (1983) is 
characterized by this pattern. There is an 
initial burst of investment in which several 
firms participate; however, when rival firms 
fall sufficiently far behind the leader, they 
prefer to drop out of the competition. Conse­
quently, the leader completes the innovation 
at its preferred, more leisurely, pace. Al­
though extremely stylized, these models in­
corporate learning and experience in a way 
not found in previous work. 
III. Conclusions
Although individual models have unam­
biguous implications, the array of existing 
models still generates considerable con­
troversy. This heightens the interest in and 
need for empirical tests of these theories. 
Unfortunately, these implications are gener­
ated by highly simplified models, which may 
make empirical testing more difficult. For 
instance, some very real aspects of industrial 
competition are left out, including the possi­
bility of incumbent advantages (for example, 
better access to capital markets, internal 
financing, economies of scope) and disad­
vantages (for example, bureaucratic red tape, 
weak employee incentives due to a tenuous 
connection between performance and re­
ward). Also left out are the possible effects of 
conglomerate diversification; all of these 
models compare expenditures in a single re­
search area, rather than in the sort of di­
versified portfolio of projects which might be 
common among large firms. 
Although some sources of data which are 
suitable for testing these hypotheses do exist, 
much of the existing data is too aggregated. 
In addition, many of these hypotheses rely 
on data which may be difficult to obtain, 
such as information about the research pro­
grams of unsuccessful firms. In order to move 
in the direction of empirical testing, we must 
both extend these models in more realistic 
directions to accomodate existing data, and 
attempt to gather the specific data required 
to test directly such models of firm behavior. 
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